• What breaks when mapping full autonomy to safety V model? -Autonomy requirements/high level design are implicit in training data -What "controllability" do you assign for full autonomy? -Nondeterministic algorithms yield non-repeatable tests
• Potential strategies for safer autonomous vehicle designs -Safing missions to minimize fail-operational cost -Run-time safety monitors using traditional high-ASIL software -Accelerated stress testing via fault injection • Assume testing representative; faults are random independent -R(t) = e -lamba*t is the probability of not seeing a crash during testing Car
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Szegedy, Christian, et al. "Intriguing properties of neural networks. " arXiv preprint arXiv:1312 .6199 (2013 .
Machine Learning requirements are the training data
• V model traces reqts to V&V
• Where are the requirements in a machine learning based system? -ML system is just a framework -The training data forms de facto requirements
• How do you know the training data is "complete"?
-Training data is safety critical -What if a moderately rare case isn't trained?
• 
Run-Time Safety Monitors
Koopman & Wagner; 16 AE-0265 8
Approach: Enforce Safety with Monitor/Actuator Pair • "Actuator" is the ML-based software -Usually works -But, might sometimes be unsafe -Actuator failures are drivability problems
• All safety requirements are allocated to Monitor -Monitor performs safety shutdown if unsafe outputs/state detected -Monitor is non-ML software that enforces a safety "envelope"
• In practice, we've had significant success with this approach -E.g., over-speed shutdown on APD -Important point: need to be clever in defining what "safe" means to create monitors -Helps define testing pass/fail criteria too 
